Preface: … as we wrote this introduction we were still waiting any definite response from the republican movement
cluster together for mutual support and a feeling of safety [7]
formal structures for separate communal autonomy well-established in some other divided communities … Belgium Canada Switzerland [9]
repartition … voluntary movement could be encouraged … govt. grants, compensation [9-10]
Some Possible Repartitions [caption 11]
Whatever the longer-term merits of greater communal separation … there can be little doubt that it would be relatively easy to bring about. The simplest and most abrupt method would be a unilateral decision by the British Govt. to writhdraw from Northern Ireland. That would be a signal for the mobilisation of paramilitary forces on either side … THE RESULT WOULD BE NOT UNLIKE THAT IN SOME PARTS OF BOSNIA, THOUGH THE SCALE OF WEAPONRY WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE SO DESTRUCTIVE. … [PARA] A precipitate and unilateral British withdrawal unlikely but not without precedent … more or les what the British govt. decided to do in Palestine in 1945, leaving the Palestinians and the Jews to fight it out for control of over terrritory – as conflict that has yet to be finally resolved. [11]
the kind of population movement leading to eventual repartition. [12]
the communal sharing option … central plank of this approach is the search for agreement between the main constitutional parties … fair employment legislation [13]
Northern Ireland Curriculum … Education for Mutual Understanding [14]
For the moment, it is sufficient to state that greater communal sharing is unlikely to be achieved by the indefinite continuation of the current political impasse or by default. That is much more likely … to lead to greater communal separation. [15]
cost of maintaining troops c. 300 million p.a. to Britain and £200 million p.a. to Ireland.
Only the IRA, Sinn Fein, and their supports cling to the view that it is the continuing British colonial involvement in NI that is causing the conflict, that once the British link is removed peace and stability will automatically follow. [21]
urges caution about wholesale acceptance of two communities analysis. [22] more intermingling of two communities than communal separation theory suggests [23] a significant community in between [23]
most public sector housing estates in larger towns have become exclusively … Protestant or Catholic [34] questionnaires show better than 74% in favour of mixed housing; reality is different. [~15]
80% thought it important that Protestant and Catholic children should be educated together but only 25% were willing to send their children to a local integrated school; in fact the figs. are Primary 90,000/96,000 and 1,700 integrated; Secondary, 40,000/25,000 and 1,300 integrated. [~43]
the education system in NI dually segregated in that children are divided both by religion and by ability [41]
jobs in banking, commerce, engineering regarded as mostly for Protestants; Catholic schools did not usually provide qualifications for them [45] no longer acceptible to regard open or covert discrimination as acceptable or unavoidable [46]
UNWILLINGNESS OF CATHOLICS TO WORK IN SECURITY FORCES [47]. There are 26,000 Protestants and 36,500 Catholics unemployed; there are 22,000 security jobs; if divided equally there would be 33,500 Protesants and 29,000 Catholics unemployed, eliminating the difference. [~48] Reducing the total numbers unemployed also reduces the differential.
the social and economic structures of NI similar to those of other declining parts of industrial UK [54]
more clearly defined and stable in voting allegiances than in other parts of Europe [54]
average figure for compensation in NI around £40 million.
IRA: ITS LEADERS AND ADHERENTS ARE COMMITTED NOT ONLY TO FINISHING THE JOB OF DRIVING THE BRITISH OUT OF IRELAND BUT ALSO TO AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT THAT STRESSES THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN IRELAND AND PLAYS DOWN THE EXSTENCE OF A PROTESTANT COMMUNITY IN NI THAT IS VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED TO IRISH UNIFICATION [76]
In some of these respects they [paramilitaries] are not unlike those who join the British Army and who are deployed against them … most had no previous criminal records [80]
stable level of killing between 50 and 100 per year. [82] Authors anticipate substantial shift in attudes and in numbers of people prepared to join or give active support to their defenders in the event of a serious deterioration of the security situation [83]
Loughgall and Gibraltar [92]
SECURITY FORCES LIKE THE PARAMILITARIES THEY CONFRONT ARE MAJOR PLAYERS WHOSE POLITICAL COMMITMENT WITH EFFECT THE OUTCOME [~94]
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act , 1973; Diplock Committee and courts [95]; Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974[97], reenacted after review in 1989.
ARMY AND POLICE NOW APPEAR TO HAVE MOVED TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT PENDING ACHIEVEMENT OF SOME FORM OF POLITICAL ACCOMODATION … IRA APPEAR TO HAVE SET THEMSELVES THE LIMITED OBJECTIVE OF AN INDEFINITE CONINUATION OF SOMETHING LIKE THEIR PRESENT LEVEL OF OPERATION IN THE HOPE THAT THAT WILL BE ENOUGH TO SECURE AN EVENTUAL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL, NOT LEAST BY A GOVT. MORE SYMPATHETIC TO IRISH UNIFICATION THAN THE CURRENT CONSERVATIVE GOVT. [103-04]
palpable sense of war-weariness [107]
IRA CAMPAIGN HAS INFLICTED EQUALLY HEAVY COSTS ON ITS OWN COMMUNITY AND HAS CAUSED A DEGREE OF COMMUNAL SEPARATION AND ANTAGONISM WHICH HAS MADE ITS ULTIMATE GOAL OF UNIFICATION EVEN LESS CREDIBLE [107]
Protestant churches less openly hostile [to unsegregated schools] but have not given much encouragement … [111]
FUNDAMENTALLY THE CHURCHES ARE MORE INTERESTED IN TENDING AND REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THEIR ADHERENTS THAN IN SERIOUS ACTION IN PURSUIT OF A LARGER ACCOMODATION. [113]
Peace People, 1976; Women Together, 1970; Warrington movement, 1993; [114-15]
The promotion of what have become popularly known as ‘two traditions’ in all forms of cultural and artistic activity has also been one of the main objectives of the new [Community Relations] Council. There is now a huge range of local projects and [117] bodies of all kinds with some cross-communal objectives or membership and a substantial amount of governmental and charitable money is spent on them … … THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT 20 YEARS OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS WORK HAS INCREASED THE PROPORTION OF PEOPLE WHO REGARD THEMSELVES AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES OR REDUCED THE TREND TOWARDS GREAT SEPARATION. [118]
attempts to get local political parties to agree on new proposals for devolved govt. [120]
British govt. talks with IRA, Feakle 1974 [129] Hume Adams talks, 1988; resumed 1993. [129]
The Downing St Declaration, 15 Dec 1993 [131]. Though the parallel statements by the British and Irish Govts. express this in slightly different ways, their essential effect is identical [viz., no unification without Unionist consent]. [132] ‘no selfish, strategic, or economic interest in NI’ [133] EMPHASIS ON PEOPLE RATHER THAN TERRITORY [134]
In economic as in many other matters NI falls somewhere between the rest of the UK and the rest of Ireland so that its best interests may better be served by recognizing and accomodating both these differing perspectives [142]
SDLP proposal that EEC might be directly involved in governing NI [143]
the fact that both UK and Ireland have given up some of their sovereignty on accession to the Treaty of Rome in 1973 and under the Single European Act of 1987 may also assist by showing that absolutist notions of a sovereign state are no longer essential to national survival as once thought to be [144]
Community decision to grant Objective 1 status to NI … treat[ing it] as special case … small compared to subvention from British Exchequer [145]
European Union might act as guarantor of a settlement between Britsh and Irish govts. and thus reassure both unionists and nationalist in NI that a new British-Irish Agreement supplementing or replacing the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 … would not be abandoned [148]
The European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism 1977 has already had an impact on arrangements for extradition [150]
NOTE that the authors list Bloody Sunday with ill treatment and torture as a human rights violation [84]
preconditions which the political leaders of both communities have set for their agreement for sharing power within NI and for the development of [North/South] links make it difficult to achieve progress towards [preferred Anglo-Irish solution] [155]
Holland sharing between Catholics and Protestants based on ‘grand compromise’ of 1917 [160] … Holland 1917 … reasonable proportion of both Protestant and Catholic ministers [163]
challenge of finding particular set of structures within which major parties are [159] prepared to work
James Prior and ‘rolling devolution’ 162] SDLP/SF and ‘Irish dimension’ [163] effectively vetoed by SF and IRA [216]
NOR IS IT CLEAR WHETHER EITHER GOVT. REALLY BELIEVES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIES ARE WILLING TO MAKE THE COMPROMISES NECESSARY FOR THE SHARING OF POWER OR WHETHER THE PRECONDITIONS SET BY UNIONISTS ON THE REMOVAL OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM OVER NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE REPUBLIC AND BY NATIONALISTS ON THE NEED FOR ALL-IRELAND INSTITUTIONS WHICH REFLECT THEIR ASPIRATIONS FOR IRISH UNITY EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDE ANY LASTING COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM. [164]
Joint authority proposed in Forum Report [165] An economic study suggested that … the bulk of subvention to NI would continue [165] to be borne by Britain; the Irish contribution was to be fixed in relation to the proportion which Irish GNP bore to English GNP, which in the mid-11980s would have been about 4%. [166]
IT WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS WHY THE BRITISH GOVT. SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO CONCEDE AN EQUAL SHARE OF AUTHORITY TO THE IRISH GOVT. WHILE CONTINUING TO PAY 96% OF THE COST OF GOVERNING NORTHERN Ireland. [166]
obvious difficulties in achieving an acceptable balance between contributions and responsibilities [169]
permanent involvement of British and Irish govts. might encourage rather than diminish confrontational attitudes [170]
alternative [to] provode external intervention only where internal power-sharing has broken down [172]
Macrory gap [174]
… REQUIRE THE GOVT. TO FACE UP TO THE ENTRENCHED INTERESTS OF THE CHURCHES AND EMBARK ON A MAJOR REORGANISATION WITH AT LEAST THE KIND OF DETERMINATION WHICH IT DISPLAYED IN RESPECT OF DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT [177]
All the parties in Northern Ireland are committed to the introduction of a Bill of Rights and the British govt. has indicated that it will not raise any objections to this despite its oppposition to the introduction of [any such] for the rest of United Kingdom. [I.e., the rule of parliament and the absence of a constitution renders a British Bill of Rights meaningless.] [180]
the economic objecgive is to improve the economic performance and prosperity of both parts of Ireland by mutual cooperation. The political objective is to assist in the process of achieving peace and stability in NI and in Ireland as a whole. [186]
Foyle fisheries Commission established in 1952 to purchase from the Irish Society the fishing rights in the estuary of the River Foyle, through which the border of NI and the Irish Republic passes … no implications of any kind in respect of Irish unification [188]
That in itself suggests that it may be better for those who aspire to the development of shared arrangements for the whole of Ireland not to insist on institutions which assert or imply any form of Irish unification but to agree to the principle of mutual recognition and reciprocity in the ceding of certain functions to an all-Ireland body. this is more likely to lead to the development of enduring institutions which make a practical contribution to economic and environmental cooperation than an attempt to impose a political blueprint. … THOSE WHO ASPIRE TO IRISH UNITY WOULD DO WELL TO FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WHO ESTABLISHED A FRAMEWORK FOR GREATER EUROPEAN UNITY THROUGH ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE 1950S AND 1960S ON AN OPEN-ENDED BASIS. [PARA] One of the most important contributions to such a process on the part of the Republic of Ireland will be the amendment of the initial articles of the Irish Constitution … [189]
Interparliamentary Body [Ireland and UK] might be given stronger powers [similar to] Nordic Council [191]
IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO SECURE SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT ON WORKABLE STRUCTURES FOR SHARING, THE BEST ALTERNATIVE MAY BE SEPARATION. THIS CAN SCARCELY BE REGARDED AS A PARTICULARILY SATISFACTORY OUTCOME. BUT IT MAY BE PREFERABLE TO INDEFINITE COMMUNAL CONFLICT. [193]
the essence of cantonal separation is the creation of as many units of local administration as are necessary to enable most people to live within a relatively homogeneous communal unit … e.g. Switzerland [193]
to show that the structures for communal separatin can be developed and that they are workable and respectable [201]
Each district or canton could recruit its own local police force, as in Switzerland … The incorporation of previously outlawed paramilitary activists in the forces of the state is a standard and usually effective means, along with an amnesty for past offences, of establishing an acceptable basis for the restoration of law and order. It was adopted in both the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland in the 1920s. [202]
redraw local govt. boundaries in such a way as to create as many relatively self-contained areas as practicable … in addition major public services such as eduction, health, social services, and recreational and cultural facilities and support, would be functionally separated [205]
the need for communal cooperation and sharing would in such a system be limited to essential regional services, such as administration of justice [206]
divergent loyalties would almost certainly result in tendency for Cath and Prot communities to seek to develop closer relationships and institutions with Irish and British govts. respectively. … right to elect representatives to Oireachtais … In such circumstances, the traditional ideal of Irish unification would become highly remote. [207]
IF THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS SHARING … THERE MUST BE A STRONG PRESUMPTION THAT IT IS BETTER TO PROCEED BY SEEKING AGREEMENT THAN BY ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE A PACKAGE, HOWEVER REASONABLE IT MAY BE IN THE ABSTRACT. [209]
One of the key elements in the Hume-Adams peace plan seems to be a proposal to deal with this impasse [which unit for self-determination?] by holding a dual referendum in NI and the Republic so that both SF and the IRA could honourably call off their campaign of violence [213]
view that power-sharing is most likely to be delivered by political leaders strong enough to lead their communities in that direction [217] … capacity of political elite to face down extremists must also be doubtful [217]
… danger that an attempt to impose some form of settlement, notably one which involved a substantial role for the Irish govt. in the internal affairs of NI or one which sought to integrate NI with the rest of the UK without any recognition of an Irish dimension, would result in a substantial hardening of attitudes within the unionist or nationalist communities … [218]
Both the IRA and loyalist paras. claim repeatedly to be acting on behalf of the Irish or the Ulster people and clear evidence in a referendum that a mjaority in both communities supported a particular settlement would destroy that claim. It would be particularly difficult for the SDLP or SF to oppose such a result, provided that it was endorsed by an equivalent majority in the Republic [220]
use of indicative referendum expressly provided for in NI Constitutional Convention of 1974, and thus in a formal provision of the NI ACt 12974, sect. 2(3).
REFERENDUM QQQs:
1] Continued Direct Rule
2] Power-sharing with joint North-South institutions
3] Separate institutions for two main communities
4] Joint authority.
The Irish undertaking [in the Downing St. Declaration] is less unequivocal and is coloured by its commitment to the ideal of Irish unification. [227]
The best way of giving formal effect to these undertakings is to translate them into the fundamental law of both states [227]
The better role for the US govt. is to give what support they can to the British and Irish govts. in pursuing the current peace and talks processes and to encourage the Irish-American community to channel its legitimate concern through economic investment [232]
European Union role similarly restricted [232]
international monitoring under CSCE procedures [should] be accepted without reservation both in respect of minority protections and human rights generally [234]
the deployment of an international peace-keeping force … would merely be a signal that the time for serious fighting had arrived. [234] [END] |