• Poems, Chiefly Lyric and Dramatic (Dublin 1793) [by subscription].
• The Wood[s]man’s Tale and The Royal Marriage: A Drama (London 1805).
• The Inferno of Dante, With a Specimen of Orlando Furioso of Ariosto, in English Verse (London 1785) [by subscription; ded. to Lord [Earl of] Bristol, Bishop of Derry].
• The Divina Commedia of Dante in English Verse, 3 vols. (London 1802).
• The Penance of Hugo: A Vision, from the Italian of Monti, with Additional Cantos (London 1805).
• The Triumph of Petrarch, Trans’d into English Verse (London 1807).

Boyd’s trans. ‘From the Italian of Dante Alighieri’ is incl. in Dante in English, ed. with notes by Eric Griffiths & Matthew Reynolds ; with an introduction by Eric Griffiths [Penguin Classics] (London: Penguin 2005), cxxxvi, 479pp. [q.pp.].

A translation of the Inferno ... in English vers [,] with historical notes, and the life of Dante; to which is added...a new translation of the Orlando Furioso of Ariosto by Henry Boyd, 2 vols. (Dublin: Byrne 1785) - the “Specimen of a new translation of Orlando Furioso by Ariosto0 [being]  Vol. II, pp 401-54.

A Translation of the Inferno ... in English verse. With historical notes, and the life of Dante (from Leonardo Bruni). To which is added a specimen of a new translation of the Orlando Furioso of Ariosto. By Henry Boyd (London: C. Dilly 1785)

The Divina Commedia of Danta Alighieri. Vol II Purgatory / trans into English verse with preliminary essays, notes, and illustrations, by the Rev Henry Boyd A.M. ([S.l.] : T. Cadell Jun and W. Davies 1802).

Divina Commedia of Dante Alighieri: consisting of the Inferno - Purgatorio - and Paradiso. Translated into English verse..by the Rev. Henry Boyd, A.M. In three vols. Vol. I-III (Printed by A. Strahan .. et el.; for T. Cadell Jun. and W. Davies 1802) [available at Hathi - online; accessed 09.07.2023.]

The Divina Commedia of Dante Alighieri: consisting of the Inferno - Purgatorio - and Paradiso. / Translated into English verse, with preliminary essays, notes, and illustrations, by the Rev. Henry Boyd, A.M., chaplain to the Right Honourable the Lord Viscount Charleville. In three volumes. (London: Printed by A. Strahan, New-Street Square; for T. Cadell Jun. and W. Davies, in the Strand., 1802.) [Vol. 1: [2], vi, [2], 408pp.; Vol. 2: [4], 384); Vol. 3: [4], 420); port.; 26 cm.] CONTENTS: Vol. 1 includes ‘A comparative view of the Inferno, with some other poems, relative to the original principles of human nature, on which they are founded, or to which they appeal,’ "Historical essay of the state of affairs in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: with respect to the history of Florence; with a view of their influence on the succeeding ages,’ “The life of Dante from Leonardo Bruni,” ‘Summary view of the Platonic doctrine, with respect to a future state. [from] Scott’s Christian life, Pt. 1, Chap. III, pp.18-74; fol. edn.’

Compositions from the divine poem of Dante Alighieri containing Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, by [ill.] John Flaxman [sculpt.] (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, & Orme 1807), 38, 38 & 33 leaves; oblong 4°.

Title: Inferno - Purgatorio - and Paradiso / translated into English verse; with preliminary essays [...] by the Rev. Henry Boyd, A.M., Chaplain to the Right Honourable the Lord Viscount Charleville, in three volumes. (London: A. Strahan, New-Street Square; for T. Cadell Jun. and W. Davies, in the Strand. 1802 - Vol. II: Preliminary Essay [... &c.] [abridgement of a larger discourse which the Translator intends, at some future time, to publish in a separate form.’

[Editorial note: In the following partial transcription of the Essay, numbers in square brackets represent the page-number appearing at the top of Boyd’s page and those in round brackets indicate the page-reference for purposes of citation. The italics are Boyd’s and the underlined phrases are mine as a pointer to Boyd"s anti-Catholic position and his adherence to a form of Protestant-Classica Stoicism. BS]

‘With regard to the first part of this Poem, where sinners are represented to us as subjected to the inevitable consequences of their corrupt habits, and reaping the fruits of their confirmed vices, it is not very material whether we suppose the descriptions of their punishments to be allegorical pictures of different species of confirmed depravity in this iife, or exhibitions of their allotments in a state of retribution in the world to come.

 To all who believe that the duration of future punishments are eternal, the difference of habitual turpitude in this life, and its consequenes in the next, will probably be considered as having the same moral effect. The reasons which induce them to believe that [3] these punishments are limited in their duration, having been detailed at some length in the Preliminary Essay to the Translation of the INFERNO. The Commentators on DANTE, who belonged, I believe, in general to the church of Rome, have descanted on the probationary scenes in the PURGATORIO, under the idea of their being real representations of those sufferings, which Spirits, not entirely depraved, must undergo in some intermediate state, between their departure from this world and their admittance to the beatific vision. Whatever might have been their real opinion, to this tenet, I suppose, they looked upon themselves as obliged to adhere, as it is one article of their professed faith. A person not, however, under such restrictions, may, I hope, be allowed to differ from these authorities sometimes, however respectable they may appear to him in general. This may be more excusable, when it is considered that their explanations are not always strictly consistent with themselves, for they often represent the scenes of the INFERNO as allegorical. It will therefore, I hope, not be thought too great a liberty, if I venture, in the first place, to adduce a few reasons which incline me to believe that the Poet has only intended to give in his PURGATORIO an allegorical representation of the means used by Providence in this life to purify the mind by various trials. Under the second, I shall endeavour to shew, that his representations accord with the usual means employed by Providence for our reformation; not indeed the only means, but a sort of preparatory discipline, which, when suffered to have its due effect, opens the way for [5] the operation of superior motives. It will appear in the third place, that this opinion may be illustrated by the moral state even of some of the most barbarous nations. This will still appear more evident when we ome, in the fourth division, to enumerate the dogmas of the most eminent sections of philosophers; for they, however opposite to each other in many respects, yet will be found to agree in one remarkable point. In this particular, it will be seen that they have a great conformity in their tendency with the spirit of Christianity, which, in the fifth section, with a few inferences, will conclude the subject. (Vol. II, pp.3-5.)

 No man should be accounted free, who has not the perfect command of himself. That which is good and becoming, ought to be purified, rather than that which [29] is pleasant. Reason, according to HERACITUS, is the test of truth.

 The happiness which belongs to man, is that state in which he enjoys as many of the good things, and suffers as few of the evils incident to human nature, as possible, passing his days in a a state of permanent tranquillity. A wise man, though deprived of sight and hearing, may experience the enjoyment of good things which yet remain; and when suffering torture, or labouring under some painful disease, can mitigate the anguish by patience, and can enjoy in his afflications the consciousness of his own constancy. But it is impossible that perfect happiness can be enjoyed without freedom from pain, and the enjoyment of the good things of life. Pleasure is in its nature good, as pain is in its nature evil; and the one is therefore to be pursued, as the other is to be avoided, for its own sake. Pleasure or pain is not only good or evil in itself, but the measure of what is good or evil in every object of desire or aversion: for the ultimate reason why we pursue one thing, and avoid another, is because we expect pleasure from the former, an apprehend pain from the latter. If sometimes we decline a pleasure, it is not because we are averse to pleasure, but because, in the present instance, we apprehend that it will necessarily be connected with a greater pain. In like manner, if we sometimes voluntarily submit to a present pain, it is because we judge that it is necessarily [30] connected with a greater pleasure. [...] That pleasure is the chief good, appears from the inclination which every animal from its birth discovers, to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain, and is confirmed by the universal experience of mankind, who are incited to action by no other principle than the desire to avoid pain, or of obtaining pleasure. [...]

 Continence is a branch of temperance, which prevents the diseases, infamy, remorse, and punishment, to which those are exposed who indulge themselves in unlawful amours. Music and poetry, which are often employed as incentives to licentious pleasures, are to be cautiously and sparingly used. [...; 33]

 A wise man, therefore, will prefer the simplicity of a rustic life to the magnificence of courts. Future events, a wise man will consider as uncertain; and will therefore neither suffer himself to be elated with confident expectation, nor to be depressed by doubt and despair, for both are equally destructive of tranquillity. It will contribute to the enjoyment of life, to consider death as the perfect termination of a happy life, which it becomes us to close, like satisfied guests, neither regretting the past, nor anxious about the future. [34].

 Justice respects man as living in society, and is the common bond without which no society can exist. This virtue, like the rest, derives its value from its tendency to promote the happiness of life. Not only is it never injurious to the man who practices it, but nourishes in his mind calm reflections and pleasant hopes; whereas, it is impossible that the mind in which injustice dwells, should not be full of disquietude; since it is impossible that iniquitous actions should promote the enjoyment of life, as much as remorse of conscience, legal penalties, and public disgrace much increase its troubles. Everyone who follows the dictates of sound reason, will practice the virtues of justice, equity, and fidelity. In SOCIETY, the necessity for the mutual exercise of justice, in order to [sic] the common enjoyment of the gifts of nature, is the grounds of those laws by which it is prescribed. It is the interest of every individual in a state to conform to the laws of justice; for by injuring no one, and rendereing every man his due, he contributes his part to the preservation of that society, upon the preservation of which his own safety depends. (p.35)

That the consideration [54] of rewards and punishments is a motive less exalted than the moral sense, is not denied; at the same time, all the arguments urged by Lord Shaftesbury and others, in favour of its exclusive title, would prove too much; for had it that imperial sovereignty thich their arguments presume, we would no longer be voluntary but necessary agents; and as the law of England, supposes of the king, we could do no wrong. / With a view to the influence of our intellectual faculties, the idea of a posthumous retribution has an effect undeniably salutary. It preserves the mind in the habitual practice of studying relations, of comparing motives, of deducing consequences, and examining the alternate preponderancy of things present and of things to come; in weighing the different moments of impulse and reason, and of judging according to their respective merits. Is this not the very mode of education which Providence seems to have adopted for our moral and intellectual improvement, with regard to the affairs of the world? Is there any of our intellectual faculties which is not improved and amelioriated by this procedure, to an high degree? If foresight be the sovereign ingredient in prudence, if prudence be the basis of all our virtues, nothing can be more important than the operation of distant object on the human mind. In a moral view, these motives have this important effect, that they serve as a salutary check upon the wild excursions of that double-faced genius, known to moderns by the name of Sentiment, whose dictates are almost (such is the effect of uniting different ideas under the same terms) as ambiguous as the [55] oracles of old. In another view, the circumstance of those compensations being in that particular point of distance, has an effect of sovereign use. Were they nearer to us, and more subject to our contemplation, they would encroach upon our free agency; and even upon our province as free actors in this sublunary world, the motives would overpower all others; were they at a greater distance than the general term of human ife, they would probably have no little or no influence on the general conduct. As it is, their effects are sufficiently moderate to leave us the consciousness of free agency, in weighing remote consequences against present impulses. These matters stand in the same position with respect to us, as the sun is observed to hold in regard to this planet: were it nearer to us, we should perish from the extreme of heat; a more distant situation would have a similar effect, from the rigours of extreme cold: his precise position is the source of life and vigour, as the distant views of future prospects are the noblest improvements of human reason, and the best security for the freedom of the will. (p.142; end.).